Articles - Al Jazeera - Date: 2025-04-07

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

The eighth of December opened a new chapter in the history of Turkish-Israeli relations. It ended two decades of cooperation and tension, especially throughout the Arab Spring. Divergence and rivalry have increased between the two regional powers. As a result, the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv has become a subject of political interest and media focus. The issue transcends regional capitals, drawing the attention of international hubs involved in decision-making.

Observers and analysts are preoccupied with examining the complexities of these relations, forecasting their future trajectories, and conducting possible scenario-building exercises. This focus is not merely because the two states are influential by conventional measures of power and capability, or because each possesses strong regional and international safety nets. In reality, the focus has to do with Syria, the focal point of the conflict and competition, and its position as the 'beating heart' of the Arab Mashriq, with influence stretching deep into the broader Middle East.

For many reasons, chief among them Syria, Turkish-Israeli relations veered off the track of open yet mistrustful cooperation onto a track of open confrontation. We do not know how the relationship will evolve, or who will ultimately have the upper hand, but before diving into the scenario-building exercises, let us first take stock of the interests and priorities of both sides.

Israel has a strong, strategic interest in the weakening of Syria, as a prelude to dividing the country into sectarian, denominational, and ethnic states and entities. This is the dream of the 'founding fathers' of the 'Jewish state,' who believed that Israel’s survival and the consolidation of its dominance over the region depend on reconfiguring it into a collection of sectarian and ethnic emirates—within which the Jews of Israel would become the largest minority, or one of the largest minorities. In this divided landscape, the racist and supposedly 'unattainable' idea of a 'Jewish state' would gain the necessary and plausible 'legitimacy.'

On the path to achieving this strategic goal, it does not matter who governs Damascus, so long as they are weak. Recently, it has no longer been necessary for the rulers of Damascus, regardless of their identity or background, to play the role of 'border guards,' since Israel’s updated national security doctrine has delegated that role to its military and intelligence agencies, to be executed directly in enemy territory. Beyond Israel’s immediate borders and domestic front, its leadership now operates under the assumption that it can both create and manage chaos in neighboring states to advance its strategic interests. The long-standing practice of recklessness and violation of Syrian airspace over the past two decades, legitimized by the Netanyahu–Putin understandings of 2015, has since expanded following the collapse of the Assad regime. This policy now includes the occupation of new Syrian territories and the declaration of security zones and buffer areas that now extend to the outskirts of Damascus and across broad stretches of Syria’s southern border.

Among the tools used to meet this objective is the idea of a 'Coalition of Minorities.' This strategy has recently been reinvigorated amid the inflation of sectarian and ethnic divisions in Syria. This includes Israel using the Kurdish card and encouraging Kurdish nationalist aspirations, with the ultimate aim of fragmenting Syria and pressuring Turkey. A state that denies the Palestinian people their right to self-determination cannot credibly present itself as a staunch defender of another people’s, the Kurds’, right to self-determination.

On the other hand, Ankara is deeply concerned about the potential 'Domino Effects', not merely a loss of influence in Syria and its surrounding region, but the risk of destabilization reaching into Turkey. If the genie of sectarian, denominational, and ethnic fragmentation escapes its bottle in Syria, it could spill over into Turkey’s demography and geography—if not immediately, then over the medium to long term. This, arguably, represents the greatest and most dangerous challenge facing Ankara since the fall of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Republic.

Turkey feels that, since the end of the Assad regime, it has become morally and politically obligated to oversee a smooth and secure transition for the entire country. A Syria mired in sectarian chaos and civil strife will become a burden on Turkey, not a strategic asset. A divided and self-fragmented Syria will not serve as a bridge to the leadership role Ankara envisions for itself across an extended Arab-Islamic axis, a role the Turkish leadership believes it is most qualified to assume. Syria, suffocating under economic and social crises, will act as a drain on Turkey’s surplus capacity, rather than a complementary partner as it ascends the ladder of emerging economies and aspires to join the ranks of the world’s top ten economies, having already secured its place in the G20.

Turkey’s strategic calculus and its reading of Syria’s place within its regional vision have not gone unnoticed by Israel’s security and strategic establishment. Tel Aviv has openly expressed concern over the emergence of a 'Sunni arc' that could replace the 'Shiite Crescent,' which it long viewed as a strategic threat—and which it succeeded in dismantling at several key points in the aftermath of the Aqsa Flood.

This arc, bearing an 'Ikhwani' (Muslim Brotherhood) character, is infused with two opposing flavors: on the one hand, a conservative Salafi strand, and on the other, a form of 'civil Islam' embodied by the experience of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). This complex mix defies easy prediction, whether in terms of its shape, actors, or outcomes.

According to Israel’s most recent strategic assessments, this arc could stretch from Turkey, through Syria, and into Jordan via the Muslim Brotherhood, on to Lebanon’s Sunnis, and ultimately to Gaza and Palestine. Because of this, the question of Israel’s relationship with Turkey has earned a place on the agenda of Israeli Security Cabinet meetings and now ranks high among the priorities of its strategic alliance with Washington.

Thus, we face a confrontational path between Ankara and Tel Aviv, both in Syria and over Syria. However, a calm and measured reflection, distanced from the noise of fiery rhetoric and the clamor of mutual accusations, leads to the conclusion that one of the following three scenarios is likely to shape the future of relations between the two countries and determine their trajectory moving forward:

The two countries could enter into a series of shifting, indirect wars through proxies. For example, Israel could continue supporting militias rebelling against Damascus and providing them with security networks, such as safe zones, areas off-limits to the Syrian army, no-fly zones, and regions free of air defenses, among other measures. In turn, Ankara could respond by supporting opposing militias, which has already happened, in the northwest, where battles have taken place between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. This scenario could easily repeat itself in other regions, including the south, where early signs are emerging–possibly under the banner of 'resistance to occupation' or through those aligned with Ankara’s goals and agenda.

In my view, Turkey prioritizes the creation of a new Syrian army that is trained, armed, and sponsored under its supervision. Until then, there seems to be no alternative but to rely on non-state actors as 'auxiliary forces' operating in coordination with and independently from the nucleus of this future army. This arrangement offers Ankara, and Damascus to a lesser extent, the ability to distance themselves from these actors’ actions when necessary. It effectively reproduces similar models that have emerged in other countries across the region.

This scenario does not discourage, but compels Ankara and Damascus to expand their deployment of Turkish forces and military bases in Syria. There is a preliminary understanding of this strategy, and efforts to explore it are underway in central Syria, specifically at the three airfields: Hama, T4, and Palmyra. At the same time, Israel has sent messages, through fire, to both Damascus and Ankara, signaling that such a move is unacceptable to Tel Aviv, and that it is determined to ensure it becomes equally intolerable to Washington.

In this scenario, the two countries lean towards negotiations and diplomacy, leading to the division of control and influence, and the drawing of red, green, and yellow lines on the Syrian map. This serves as an alternative to a despised and highly dangerous partition, and a direct war that everyone wants to avoid. This scenario draws parallels from what happened between Israel and the Assad regime during the outbreak of the civil war when the Syrian army entered in support of the Lebanese forces. During this time (1975–1976), Damascus adhered to Israel's established red lines in southern Lebanon. Such a scenario necessitates the intervention of a heavyweight mediator, like the United States, an ally of Israel and a friend of Turkey. This scenario does not require formal, written agreements. Instead, reaching 'gentlemen's understandings' under American endorsements is sufficient to uphold divisions. Understandings like these have survived in other times and places more effectively than written agreements.

At best, this scenario may include Israeli withdrawals from recently occupied Syrian territories. The scenario may restore the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, but under different conditions, favoring Israel. First, the agreement may allow retention of 'commanding' positions on mountain peaks and water sources. Second, it may enable consideration of a more significant Israeli security role in all matters related to monitoring procedures and 'rapid intervention' in the event of an 'emerging security threat.’ These unspoken stipulations may mirror how the U.S. and Israel handled the November 27 agreement in Lebanon, where bilateral understandings addressed sensitive issues that were challenging to incorporate into the formal ceasefire agreement.

If relations progress positively along the Ankara–Washington–Tel Aviv axis, Turkey could assume the role of 'mediator' between Syria and Israel. Turkish diplomacy typically favors this role and wants to mediate for various countries experiencing ongoing crises. Ankara had previously played this role during Bashar al-Assad's regime, shortly before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. It is unlikely that the occupied Syrian Golan Heights would be included in any negotiation agenda between Damascus and Tel Aviv, as this is not an option Israel is willing to consider, especially after Trump recognized Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights during his first term. However, these occurrences do not prevent reaching new understandings or reviving old agreements, aimed at reducing tensions along the Syrian-Israeli border and stopping the blatant aggressions against Syrian land, people and resources.

In the foreseeable future, negotiations may be limited to these topics. Notably, the negotiations themselves might be strategic for Damascus to alleviate international isolation and lift global sanctions. The talks may reintegrate Syria into the global economic and financial system, and promote international recognition of the transition and the new administration's legitimacy. We have seen this before in numerous Arab countries, where negotiations with Israel, and sometimes normalization with it, served as a gateway to achieving other objectives.

The third scenario is the least probable. A sharing approach between Israel and Turkey is unlikely since Tel Aviv currently operates in a fascist-expansionist manner, hindering cooperation. These days, Israel’s government is experiencing a peak of arrogance and euphoria of its dominance and hegemony, while the pace of 'proxy wars' between both sides intensifies. This scenario would place a significant NATO power, Turkey, in direct confrontation with the West’s and the United States’ most important ally, Israel. A war like this, between two powerful states, would be unlike any war the region has seen in recent decades.

This scenario is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future. Each country has priorities that it must address first. From Israel's perspective, striking Iran remains a top priority, and takes precedence over the 'creeping Turkish threat.' Ankara wants to avoid being entangled in a war with an enemy of Israel’s caliber and its Western alliances. However, we live in a time filled with surprises that go beyond our imagination and exceed the limits of what was once conceivable–surprises that would be dismissed as a fantasy days before happening. The leader of the West, head of NATO, and the world’s most powerful nation no longer hesitates to assert its power—whether by attempting to seize territory belonging to fellow NATO member Greenland/Denmark, pursuing the annexation of a vast neighboring state like Canada, or laying claim to strategic regions such as the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal.

Today, the bottom line is what Lenin said more than a hundred years ago: “The theory is grey, but the tree of life is evergreen." "Real life in Syria and its surroundings is always filled with the new and the unexpected. What takes place and shapes Syria’s future may come as a blend of scenarios one and two. In the context of Turkey and Israel, the two countries are likely to launch a series of ‘proxy wars’ with the ultimate goal of negotiating deals and settlements. Countries tend to push themselves to the ‘brink of the abyss’ before stepping back to avoid slipping into irreversible consequences. However, the scenario of slipping remains possible, as many nations and states have fallen into wars they did not seek and did not want.