Articles - Al Mayadeen - Date: 2025-04-17

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

The negotiations in Muscat over Iran’s nuclear program differ from the Vienna talks that took place ten years ago and resulted in an agreement. Back then, a semblance of balance and stability in international relations still existed, represented by the “P5+1” mechanism. Today, negotiations are taking a bilateral shape with Oman as a mediator. At the time, some respect for the international system, its laws, and the global order remained, but all of that has now gone with the wind. Hegemony, arrogance, and supremacy have become defining features of international relations, as Washington attempts to delay its departure from its position as the “sole superpower”. This position has been wavering over the past decade with the emergence of new global and regional players and power blocs. In this article, I am not referring to the negotiation methods — direct or indirect — as that seems to be beside the main issue at stake.

At its time, Iran was at the peak of its power in the region. Its axis or “crescent” stretched from the Caspian Sea to the eastern Mediterranean. Its allies were also at the height of their power in their respective countries, with some playing roles that extended beyond their national borders. Russia had established a foothold in the warm waters of the Mediterranean and had not yet become entangled in a war of attrition with the West in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Obama was leading a Democratic administration that placed the idea of a “political solution” to the Iranian issue at the top of its priorities. That administration was also more open and accepting of Shiite political Islam than of Sunni political Islam, given that most global jihadist movements emerged from the latter.

All of that now seems behind us. Unlike the “open-ended timeline” for negotiations that led to the Vienna Agreement during Obama’s presidency, we are now dealing with much tighter deadlines. Trump has little tolerance, and his patience is “tactical,” in stark contrast to Iran’s “strategic” patience. Deadlines are set within months, not years. As Iran claims, Trump’s declared two-month deadline for the negotiations to end might not be realistic. Still, any extension is unlikely to exceed a few months at best.

Previously, negotiations took place under the pressure of economic sanctions, but the military’s baton was neither heavy nor brandished. Today, the talks are taking place under the weight of “maximum sanctions,” while the baton of military action hangs over everyone’s heads. Efforts to build the necessary force to strike Iran’s nuclear and strategic facilities are moving ahead at full speed.

In the past, Israel had not dared to openly strike deep inside Iran with its air force, while officially claiming responsibility. Nor had Iran dared to do anything similar. Today, the picture looks different. Both sides have exchanged strikes deep within each other’s territory, moving beyond proxy wars, security operations, and cyberattacks to direct confrontation. What happened in 2024 in terms of mutual military strikes could occur on a broader and more intense scale in 2025. The “psychological barrier” has been broken, to use Anwar Sadat’s expression. However, this is not a barrier for negotiations as he once meant, but rather a barrier of gunfire and mutual strikes.

Before now, fascism and religious Zionism had not yet swept through Israeli society, the political class, and the deep state institutions, even though Netanyahu, at the head of Likud, was already in power at the time. Today, Israel has been overtaken entirely by far-right fascist extremism, reaching a level of brutality unmatched by any other state or entity in the world. Within Israel, across both the government and the opposition, and at both the political and military levels, there are those eagerly waiting to seize the “rare opportunity” of striking Iran’s nuclear program. These figures are awaiting a green light from a U.S. administration that shares the same ideology as Israel. While they may have lost hope in getting approval from the Obama administration, they now eagerly look to an administration known for its recklessness. This administration hesitates neither in politics nor war, just as it does not in economics or social affairs.

Previously, some Arab states shared Israel’s enthusiasm for striking Iran. This excitement reached unprecedented levels during Trump’s first administration, especially after many Arab rulers were relieved of the pressures and constraints imposed by the Obama administration. Today, it appears that some of those same actors have lost their “appetite” for confrontation with Iran, shifting their focus inward and reprioritizing domestic concerns over regional ones. However, the developments following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, along with the support fronts in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, and the recent weakness and setbacks faced by Iran’s axis and its allies, have reignited the appetite of a wide range of actors, both Arab and non-Arab, to decisively end their struggle (wage war against) this axis. They have begun to openly call for disarming Hamas as a precondition for a ceasefire and the entry of aid into Gaza; disarming Hezbollah as a prerequisite for reconstruction; eliminating the Houthis (Ansar Allah); and even threatening a ground war as a gateway to resolving the Yemeni crisis and reclaiming control over the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Horn of Africa. These may have been their hidden (and malicious) ambitions for the past two decades, but the extent to which they voiced or concealed them has shifted with changing U.S. administrations, Israeli governments, and the surrounding regional and international conditions. Now, they feel a surplus of power, whether rightly or delusionally, and believe that the opportunity to win the conflict and turn this final battle into “the last war” may not come again, and should not be wasted.

In Muscat, we are facing negotiations under completely different regional and international conditions. Iran is entering them with a weaker bargaining position, yet it is not stripped of power and leverage. Otherwise, the Trump administration would not have prioritized diplomacy over military action, which is always on the table. Iran knows that what it achieved in Vienna may not be attainable in Muscat or in other capitals that may host future rounds of negotiations. The Iranian negotiator now finds himself face-to-face with his American counterpart, without the supportive Russian stance or the soft, conciliatory European approach. Tell me the conditions, balances, and dynamics at play, and I will tell you how the negotiations will end.

If Iran succeeds in securing a middle-ground agreement between the Israeli position favoring a “Libyan scenario” of complete nuclear dismantling, and the American position calling for maximum oversight, control, and safeguards ensuring the program remains non-militarized, then it will have minimized its losses. At this stage, Iran and its axis are focused on minimizing losses, not on scoring points.

If Iran succeeds in keeping its missile program off the negotiating table, it will secure another gain. This outcome protects a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar investment that has become the “crown jewel” of the Islamic Republic’s national security strategy.

When it comes to Iran’s “destabilizing role” in the region – meaning Tehran’s support for its allies in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine – I do not expect it to receive much attention in Muscat. Not because these have become insignificant players, but because the aftermath of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” has weakened each of them locally and regionally, stripping them of power and influence, and limiting them to narrow “localism” roles.

There is no need in demanding that Iran stops supporting Hezbollah, as long as forces from Lebanon (from various governmental, economic, and administrative bodies) and Syria’s new regime remain more eager than Washington to block Iran’s supply lines. There is also no need for Tehran to stop supporting Hamas, as long as the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank actively opposes Hamas, in coordination and cooperation with the Israeli occupier, and a war of encirclement, cleansing, and genocide is waged against the group in the Gaza Strip. Likewise, Iran is not expected to stop backing its affiliated groups in Iraq, so long as developments in Iraq are increasingly pulling the country away from Tehran and toward growing American and Arab influence. As for Yemen, it is already facing direct U.S. military action. There are growing fears that ground battles and wars will follow and replicate the “Syrian scenario” with slight variations.

This does not mean that negotiation process in Muscat will end with an Iranian surrender. After all, Iran has not surrendered on weaker and less significant fronts, like Lebanon and Gaza. However, it does not mean an agreement is guaranteed. It would be naïve to dismiss the scenario of a military strike on Iran. The future of Iran, its Islamic revolution, and its regional allies, and indeed, its entire sphere of influence, will be determined by the outcome of the Muscat talks and the intense race between war and diplomacy. Whatever the case, Iran and the region will not be the same as they were before.