Articles - Others - Date: 2025-04-30

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

The 32nd session of the Palestinian Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has concluded, with the curtain falling on the election of Hussein Al-Sheikh as Vice President of the Organization and the state. But the repercussions of the event are far from over, and the debate surrounding it will not subside any time soon.

A wave of questions and conflicting opinions has swept through Palestinian political, media, and social circles in the aftermath. Here, we will pause at ten of the most pressing questions and offer proposed answers in hopes of fostering a deeper dialogue and realigning the political discourse.

Without sugarcoating hard truths, this session can only be seen as one lacking political legitimacy, held by a body burdened with more roles and powers than it can bear. It’s part of a continuous effort to reshape the Palestinian political system to fit the mold of a handful of entrenched leaders – leaders without public credibility, as shown by their meager results in successive public opinion polls, and who are widely feared to be steering the people, the cause, and the national project toward disaster.

The meeting was held with “whoever was present” among loyalists and backers, and the remnants of outdated factions. Major national and resistance factions, both within and outside the PLO, were absent: some boycotted publicly and in advance; some weren’t invited at all; and others withdrew during the session in protest at the absurdity of the performance on the Council’s stage.

A crowded agenda and a final statement at odds with its own contents served primarily to obscure the meeting’s sole real objective: the election of a vice president. The president had already unilaterally claimed the authority to select his deputy and successor without consultation. He also tightly circumscribed the vice president’s powers, reserving for himself the authority to appoint, delegate, and dismiss. In effect, the vice presidency is entirely subordinate to, and dependent on, the presidency.

History seems to be repeating itself, this time as farce. What Arafat once did to Abbas as prime minister, Abbas is now doing to his own deputy and successor as head of both the Authority and the Organization. The cycle continues with new names, but none that rise above the old pattern. From a constitutional standpoint, anything built on illegitimacy is legally null and void, as legal scholars argue. A body that lacks legitimacy, or whose mandate has expired, cannot grant legitimacy to any person, role, or office. Politically, we are entering a new era. The national movement we’ve known for sixty years is ending, giving way to a “post-national movement” phase. This shift requires a critical reassessment of our priorities, goals, tools, and slogans – including abandoning illusions about dialogue, reconciliation, unity, and internal reform within the current framework.

It means that the Palestinian president has succumbed to external pressures and dictates, as evidenced by the warm reception his selection received from certain capitals and the comfort expressed by Israeli circles at the appointment of “their man in the Muqata'a” as the second-in-command and presumed successor. This move is a prelude to accelerating adaptation to the Israeli solution to the Palestinian issue – nothing more, nothing less.

The other side of the equation is the president and the Ramallah Troika's failure to respond to the calls from their people, factions, figures, and initiatives for national unity and internal reorganization. That door has been slammed shut – firmly – especially after the fiery opening speech titled "Sons of Dogs." What happened was not a reform move, as the Authority and its spokespeople claim, but rather a setup to sow chaos within the ruling party. Since the Council’s decision and Al-Sheikh’s appointment, Fatah has entered a new phase of internal conflict among its wings and factions. Instead of organizing the internal order, the decision is expected to provoke disarray within the Authority and Fatah, and new developments will surely emerge.

“Security coordination” and aligning Palestinian steps with the occupation’s demands will define the coming phase. Efforts will be made to replicate the model used in the West Bank in Gaza and even in Lebanon’s refugee camps, where a “historic” visit is expected, aimed at “disarming Palestinians” and leaving the camps to face their security and legal fates alone.

Originally, the PLO earned its historic status as the representative of a people who, between the Nakba and the defeat, were subjected to the most brutal forms of dispossession, erasure, and dispersal – almost wiped off the map, both geographically and politically. After it was reclaimed from the grip of the Arab regimes, the PLO became a true representative of the Palestinian people – though that didn’t prevent it from making foolish decisions that had serious consequences for the cause and the national project.

Today, the PLO stands at a new and more dangerous crossroads. The once-untouchable relic is beginning to rust, and it must not be allowed to drag the Palestinian people down with it – or barter them away in the name of legitimacy. The “seal” of legitimacy must be used only when and where it is truly warranted – otherwise, that legitimacy must be revoked. Palestine, both as a cause and as a people, is the true destination. The PLO is a vehicle, not an end in itself – especially when it sinks into complicity with, and adaptation to, liquidationist agendas.

The story of the “sole legitimate representative” has, over the years, turned into the greatest tool of obstruction against the creation of national, popular, and resistance-based Palestinian alternatives. We are constantly warned to protect the PLO and the aim, consciously or not, is always to prevent any attempt at forging a new path. Yes, the PLO has achievements that must not be discarded – but building an infrastructure capable of catching the fruit when it ripens is a task that cannot be delayed, deferred, or dodged, no matter the accusations surrounding such efforts, and no matter how different today’s context may be from that of 1969.

“Not in Our Name” is a proposed slogan for national campaigns aimed at delegitimizing the ruling cliques dominating the PLO, the practices and policies that undermine the Palestinian people and their struggle, and the decisions, institutions, and leaderships that are themselves illegitimate – either due to the expiration of their mandate, or their overreach beyond the bounds of national and popular legitimacy. The time has come to abandon hesitation, to shake off the dust of delusions, and to reject the tactics of political manipulation.

What can the power-holders in the PLO expect in return for all this adaptation to the dictates of the occupation and the capitals that support or collude with it? What will they gain from reshaping the Palestinian political system? In truth, nothing – nothing but further demands for concessions and surrender. The more fascist and annihilationist the enemy becomes, the more PLO leadership accommodates, lowering the bar of national demands, dignity, and rights.

They have no place in the calculations of Israel or the United States. The genocidal war on Gaza continues in full force, while the so-called “liberation of Judea and Samaria” consumes more rights, gains, and sacred sites by the day. There is not even a term in Israel’s lexicon that refers to a viable “Palestinian entity” – let alone a state, or a two-state solution. In their vision, there is no place for Abbas or Hamas, for Fatah and the PA, or for any form of resistance.

The geographic dispersion of Palestinians, compounded by their political and organizational fragmentation, and the cooptation and distraction of the West Bank since the Second Intifada, have all had dire consequences. Most importantly, the presence of the occupation, bearing down with its full weight on the chests of the people, has served as a "safety net" for the Authority and the leadership.

Palestinians’ fear of internal conflict – while the occupation still suffocates them – has also led to stagnation. The economic and employment dependence of broad segments of Palestinian society on the Authority, the fragmentation and dispersion of factions, the opportunism of some, and the dependence of others on external funding, alongside the "Islamic" identity of the most influential and popular forces and the broader regional and international aversion to “political Islam”... all of these factors have acted as brakes on the movement for change. These combined objective and subjective conditions have led to the failure of efforts to revive, reform, and democratize the PLO and the broader political system.

Two main fears have stood in the way of any efforts to pursue alternative paths. The first is the fear of being accused of squandering the achievement of the “sole legitimate representative” and of aligning with Arab or regional attempts to take control of Palestinian representation. The second is the fear of repeating the failures of past unity efforts – from the Rejectionist Front during the Beirut era, to the Salvation Front in the Damascus era, and the Democratic Alliance in between, to more recent and incomplete attempts to form unified alliances capable of pressuring the entrenched leadership. The catastrophic outcomes of all these experiences have effectively discouraged any efforts to challenge the dominant leadership’s legitimacy.

Additionally, other factors have shaped this reluctance to seek alternatives. Among them is the persistent hope for a “Fatah awakening,” a hope that should have been extinguished by the aftermath of October 7. Another factor is the Arab and international push to marginalize the PLO in favor of the Palestinian Authority, reducing the Palestinian people to those in the West Bank and Gaza, and laying the groundwork to erase the refugee issue and the right of return. This difficult reality highlights the fact that Arab geography has become inhospitable to Palestinian national political efforts. There is now a lack of venues to develop new alternatives or initiatives – an environment that starkly different from the situation twenty or thirty years ago.

The upheaval of October 7 presented a historic opportunity to launch new internal Palestinian dynamics. It is no secret that one of the goals of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was to reshape the Palestinian leadership and authority structure, opening it up to various forces on the basis of partnership and resistance. The momentum generated by this upheaval could have catalyzed a parallel shift within the Palestinian political system, were it not for hesitation and inaction. However, the window of opportunity was brief, and the developments that followed the operation have made the task today more difficult and complex today. In fact, it is these very developments that now allow the dominant leadership to openly declare its intentions and throw its agenda in the faces of all Palestinians without fear or hesitation.

Many Palestinians recognized the magnitude of the opportunity and challenge presented by Al-Aqsa Flood. Numerous initiatives and calls were issued by various Palestinian figures and organizations, including the Palestinian National Conference in Doha this February. However, none of these efforts broke free from the confines of familiar, pre-packaged ideas that are always ready for deployment, but whose impact fades as soon as they are expressed. Various actors continued to issue pleas, demands, and calls for dialogue with the authority and presidency, but these efforts failed to generate meaningful pressure or mobilize significant support. Even the Palestinian National Conference experience remained a half-measure, waiting for Ramallah to embrace the logic of dialogue and reconciliation. But Ramallah did not bend; instead, it bared its fangs in its latest Central Council meeting, and the momentum for change remained stalled in the rut of stagnation and inertia.

Palestinian reformists, aspiring for change and democratization, are much like the authority itself. Abbas speaks of “legitimizing” and “renewing” the Palestinian system through elections, with the keys to those elections, and the right to determine Jerusalem’s involvement in them, placed in Netanyahu’s pocket. Reformists, for their part, placed the keys to reform in Abbas’s hands, embracing the option of dialogue, reconciliation, and partnership. Both bets have proven to be illusory.

As the Palestinian debate intensifies over the issue of the “sole legitimate representative,” and whether it is permissible to explore alternative options, Israel is working to impose its own vision for the future of Palestinian representation and governance, both in the West Bank and Gaza. What I fear most is that our goals and fears will be gradually lost with every achievement Israel secures along this path, and that our dialogues will become redundant and irrelevant.

In Gaza, the highest Palestinian aspiration appears to be “community backup,” detached from factions and factionalism, Fatah and Hamas, and instead supported by security apparatuses cut from the cloth of Dayton’s mission and his “new Palestinian breed.” In the West Bank, Israel seems set on continuing its project to dismantle and shrink the Palestinian Authority, reviving the “city links” project or the “seven ununited Palestinian emirates.” The goal is to dilute the authority in favor of a compliant local leadership. Meanwhile, the dismantling of Hamas’s rule in Gaza has become a project colluded upon with Arabs and internationals alike.

Amid the devastation surrounding Gaza and its people, Hamas finds itself forced to accept said “backup” and relinquish its control over the Gaza Strip. It is not unlikely that the troika will accept the administration of “Ramallah-Al-Bireh Emirate,” along with a few “VIP” cards, marking the end of aspirations for independence, return, and self-determination. The same empty slogans of “the sole representative,” “independence of decision-making,” and “the first bullet and the first stone” will continue unabated.

There is no alternative to challenging the dominant leadership’s claim to legitimacy and exclusivity of representation, under the banner of “Not in Our Name.” Hesitation is not an option, as long as Israel continues to advance and legitimize its projects in concert with Ramallah’s old-new leadership. What’s needed now is sustained effort to reorganize the Palestinian people through alternative and parallel grassroots organizations and unions. In stable countries, multiple unions and associations often represent the same profession or sector; so what about the Palestinian situation, where these organizations have been seized, hollowed out, and turned into replicas of the Revolutionary Youth Union and the Ba’ath Vanguards? The time has come to build a broad, united national front – bringing together individuals and factions, initiatives and conferences, organizations and unions, at home and in the diaspora – in the name of liberating the PLO and reclaiming it from those who have hijacked it. Until that goal is realized, there is no harm in establishing a “second address” for the Palestinian people – especially when the first has long proven untrustworthy, and, after recent developments, has become all the more troubling.