Articles - Others - Date: 2025-06-23

By: Oraib Al Rantawi

Iran has several options to respond to the blatant U.S. aggression against three of its nuclear facilities, options that experts and researchers have extensively discussed.

These options include: direct strikes on U.S. bases and assets in the region; delegating the task to allies within the resistance axis while maintaining a safe distance from direct confrontation with Washington; playing the Strait of Hormuz card—and perhaps also the Bab al-Mandab card—using its significant naval forces for this and other purposes; withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); or absorbing the strike and suppressing its anger in order to preserve the regime and its remaining strategic assets. It could also focus on targeting Israel, based on the logic that there is a "unity of purpose" between Israel and the U.S., such that striking the former is tantamount to striking the latter.

In fact, there is rarely a single option that actors bind themselves to. What is usually referred to as the 'alternative scenario' when analyzing possible responses and future scenarios is, in reality, a blend of several of them. This is what Tehran appears to be heading toward.

Each of the options above carries its own risks; some could be considered 'suicidal,' while others are worthless for shifting the course of events or restoring some balance, influence, or standing. As it considers its options today in light of the regional landscape that has emerged since October 7, Iran is not aiming for 'total victory.' Rather, it seeks to project an image of steadfastness and resolve, rejecting attempts to force it to swallow the bitter pill of surrender while holding out hope for resurgence.

In this sense, I believe a direct clash with the U.S. military, naval, and diplomatic presence in the region would be a reckless gamble, and arguably a spectacularly suicidal option. This is not only because the Trump administration would respond with lethal force, at least to avoid being drawn into a prolonged war of attrition, which Trump does not want and the MAGA movement seeks to avoid, but also because such a move would be a free gift to Binyamin Netanyahu, who has long yearned to drag the U.S. into a 'reactor war' and dreams of seeing the world's superpower fighting on his behalf.

Such a move would severely damage an Iranian strategy that Tehran has patiently and painstakingly developed over recent years, namely, the 'normalization' of its relations with neighboring countries, particularly Arab states across the Gulf. U.S. bases and assets are concentrated in these countries and others. Attacking, regardless of the legal or moral justifications, could provoke those countries and would roll back Iran/Arab relations to times of conflict and division. This is the last thing Iranian diplomacy wants.

Ruling out this costly scenario does not mean Tehran will remain silent in the face of the treacherous U.S. strike. Iran may consider calculated alternatives, much like it did after the 2020 assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. Its strikes on the Ain al-Assad base ended that round of direct conflict without opening the door to all-out war, thanks to precise calculations and a refusal to heed emotional and vengeful impulses.

Tehran has the right to consider closing the Strait of Hormuz in response to blatant U.S./Israeli aggression. But to exercise that right would be to take the Samson option and bring the temple down on everyone. The consequences of such a move would not be confined to Iran's Arab and non-Arab neighbors but would also affect Tehran's major allies, particularly China. It should not be treated as just another bullet in the chamber; it is the last bullet, and Iran must treat it as such and under no circumstances shoot itself in the foot.

What goes for Hormuz also goes for Bab al-Mandab, with the added costs associated with gambling on the Houthis, who remain Iran's most loyal and committed supporters, with the most elements of power and capabilities still intact. This makes them a central target for U.S., NATO, and Israeli retaliation, possibly in partnership with some Arab or local forces.

Exiting the NPT and withdrawing from the IAEA could be one of Iran's options. Some see it as too costly, but the fact is that Iran's adherence to both did not protect it from Israeli aggression or U.S. attack. This move may be warranted, provided it is part of a broader package with multiple tracks and open options.

In my view, and I believe it to be a justified one, the most effective option for responding to the joint U.S./Israeli aggression is to strike Israel with force, over an extended period, as part of a strategy of making them pay and making arrogance and overreach more costly. There are indicators that suggest Iran may be heading down this path and may persist in it.

This option could reduce the chances of Washington rushing into open war with Iran. Even at the height of Trump's boasting over his military accomplishments and his admiration for the Israeli army's performance, he never linked halting strikes on Israel with Washington returning to war. He said he would respond strongly, harshly, and swiftly if U.S. interests or assets were hit, not if Iran continued strikes on Israel.

That does not mean he would not rush to Tel Aviv's aid if it sensed the likelihood of defeat or collapse. That has never been a question for this U.S. administration or any before it, nor will it be for its successors. But Tehran can begin to reestablish a semblance of balance and deterrence if it makes the Israelis cry out in pain, and it is capable of doing so, forcefully and decisively, without hesitation.

Iran's most effective option for responding to this dual aggression centers on striking Israel, with force and severity, until it cries out first. The final missile in this war must come from Iran. That does not preclude the use of some of the tools from its other options: Targeted, calculated strikes on U.S. targets and interests; severing ties with the IAEA and its director, who is suspected of playing a soft role in spearheading the aggression; and mobilizing allies without entangling or embarrassing them, each according to their capacity, lest it backfire against them in light of the difficult and sensitive circumstances many of them currently face. Diplomatic, legal, political, media, and psychological tools are always on the table and should accompany whatever Tehran chooses from its basket of many options. This is a critical, complicated moment, and any miscalculation could be fatal.

I have not discussed the option of swallowing the strike and humiliation because, quite simply, that is another form of suicide. Iran would not remain intact if it went down that road, and its political system would be left with nothing to say or offer if it failed the test of endurance and resolve. I also have not discussed this option because not a single patriotic Iranian has mentioned it, and that is a sign that it appeals only to the imagination of Iran's defeated enemies who are haunted by dark sectarian and ideological obsessions.